In formalising temporal reasoning, should a proposition be allowed to change its truth value in nitely often over a nite period of time? It has been widely felt that for many types of proposition this phenomenon, which following Hamblin we call \intermingling", should be outlawed. In this paper we systematically examine the varieties of intermingling, distinguishing intermingling over an interval from intermingling at an instant. We survey the axioms that have been proposed in the literature to rule out intermingling, and determine precisely which varieties of intermingling are ruled out by which axioms. We distinguish \weak" non-intermingling principles, which only rule out one or two forms of intermingling, from \strong" non-intermingling principles which rule out all or most forms of intermingling. We show that none of the rst-order solutions in the literature su ces to rule out all forms of intermingling, though a second-order solution can do so.
Introduction
Anyone who sets about trying to systematize the principles of temporal reasoning sooner or later comes face to face with the problem of what to do about the possibility of a proposition changing its truth value in nitely often in a nite period of time. Should one allow this to happen, and if not, how should one prevent it? This phenomenon has been given a number of di erent names in the literature, e.g. \fuzz" Prior 8] \inde nite intermingling" Hamblin 5] \clustered variation" Davis 4] The phenomenon seems to be unavoidable; sometimes, at any rate it is harmless, and it would be pleasant if all the unavoidable instances were of the harmless kind. An example is the proposition The temperature in Cleveland is a rational number of which McDermott 7] says that`assuming the temperature is smoothly changing, it will change truth value in nitely often in any nite interval'.
Another, ancient example, is provided by one of Zeno's paradoxes, the \Achilles": Zeno claimed that Achilles cannot run from A to B since rst he must reach the halfway point A 1 , then the three-quarters point A 2 , then the seven-eighths point A 3 , and so on, there being an in nite number of such divisions to traverse before reaching B. Zeno, apparently, used this as one of a set of arguments to prove that motion was impossible (so that what appears to us as motion must be some kind of illusion)|but equally we can use our conviction that motion is possible to show that sometimes we must allow a proposition to change truth value in nitely often in a nite interval, a suitable proposition in this case being`Achilles has passed an even number of the divisions A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , etc.'.
In the discussion of Zeno, Thompson 9] considered the case of a lamp which is switched alternatively on and o : on at one minute to midnight, say, then o half a minute later, then on again a quarter of a minute after that, and so on, so that the lamp is switched on and o in nitely many times during the minute leading up to midnight. This particular \supertask" is one which it will generally be agreed can under no circumstances be carried out; the proposition`The lamp is on' can only change truth-value nitely often over a nite interval.
So there seems to be a distinction between propositions (such as`The lamp is on') such that a change in their truth value corresponds to the kind of change (a \real" as opposed to merely conceptual change) that can only occur nitely often in a nite time, and propositions (such as`The temperature is rational' or`Achilles has passed an even number of divisions') which can occur in nitely often in a nite time.
It is easy to convince oneself that for practical matters of temporal reasoning, one might do well to con ne one's attention to propositions of the former kind. And indeed, special names have been invented for these, e.g., \phenomenal predicate" Hamblin 5] \fact" McDermott 7] (Thus McDermott says that the temperature in Cleveland's being a rational number is not a fact.)
Having named the phenomenon one wants to outlaw, and the class of propositions for which one wants to outlaw it, one then has the task of setting up the technical apparatus to do the job. This has proved to be less easy than one might imagine. A number of di erent principles have been proposed for outlawing the phenomenon, and a number of di erent descriptions of the phenomenon have been given. As far as I know, no-one has ever examined these in a systematic way to determine precisely what each proposed principle achieves and how it is related to the others. That is the purpose of the present paper. (Note though that Davis 4] examines in some detail the implications of allowing certain forms of the phenomenon that others have tried to rule out.)
Before proceeding any further, we must establish at the outset the existence of two distinct phenomena to which the names`fuzz',`intermingling', or`clustered variation' could apply. These can be introduced by means of two quotations from Arthur Prior, who speaks of : : :a period of fuzziness during which between any pair of moments in which p is true there will be one at which it is false : : :, and between any pair of moments at which p is false there will be one at which it is true 1 and a little later in the same book
: : :what I have called a`fuzz' of p's and Np's in the immediate past, i.e., between any past moment of p's truth and the present, however close, there is a moment of p's falsehood, and conversely 2 adding that this construction is not available in discrete time.
So we have here two distinct phenomena, namely: 1. A proposition changing truth value in nitely often in any subinterval of a given interval. We shall call this`intermingling over an interval'. 2. A proposition changing in nitely often in any interval ending at a given instant.
We shall call this`intermingling before an instant'. We could add to this a \mirror-image" version of the second:
3. A proposition changing in nitely often in any interval beginning at a given instant. We shall call this`intermingling after an instant'. Later on we shall characterise these varieties more formally.
The temporal theory
In order to present a formal treatment of intermingling phenomena we must rst establish the formal temporal theory we shall be working in. Some of the authors who have discussed intermingling have done so in a framework based on time instants, others have done so in a framework based on time intervals. We do not wish to prejudge this issue and shall therefore present a temporal framework that can be adapted to either possibility. Speci cally, we shall introduce an instant-based theory and an interval-based theory, and show how the interval-based theory can be simulated within the instant-based theory. The general ideas are quite familiar from the literature, so the main task to be accomplished here is to establish the particular notations and axioms that we shall be using.
The interval-based theory, I, takes intervals as the primitive units, with a primitive relation`j' (read`meets'). It thus posits an ordering (I; j) satisfying the axioms I1. 8i; j; k; l(ijk^ijl^jjk ! jjl) I2. 8i; j; k; l(ijk^jjl ! ijl (i < l) (j < k)) I3. 8i9j; k(jjijk) I4. 8i; j; k; l(ijjjl^ijkjl ! j = k) I5. 8i; j; k; l(ijjjkjl ! i < l) I6. 8i; j; k(ijjjk ! 9j 0 ; j 00 (ijj 0 jj 00 jk))
where` ' denotes exclusive`or',`ijjjk' abbreviates`ijj^jjk', and`i < j' abbreviates 9k(ijkjj)'. Axioms I1{I5 are essentially the same, apart from di erences in notation, as the axioms M1{M5 of Allen and Hayes 3]. The intuition motivating the use of j' is the idea of the end of one interval being simultaneous with the beginning of the other|though these`ends' and`beginnings', being instants, nd no expression in the formalism. Note that it can be proved from the axioms that`j' is irre exive, asymmetric and antitransitive.
We shall de ne additional notations in I as follows: Weak precedence' i < j = def (i < j) _ ijj Subinterval'
Concatenation' i t j exists i ijj, and is then the unique interval such that 8k((kji t j $ kji)^(i t jjk $ jjk)) The existence of i t j if ijj is guaranteed by Axioms I3 and I5, while its uniqueness is guaranteed by Axiom I4.
The instant-based theory, which we shall call T , takes instants as the primitive units of time. We posit an unbounded, dense, total ordering (T; <), satisfying the axioms:
Here t u abbreviates (t < u) _ (t = u), and t < u < v abbreviates (t < u)^(u < v). Two obvious models for T , which we shall have frequent cause to refer to, are real-numbers time, or IR-time, in which (T; <) is isomorphic to the normal ordering (IR; <) on the real numbers, and rational-numbers time, or Q I -time, in which (T; <) is isomorphic to the normal ordering (Q I ; <) on the rational numbers.
We can introduce intervals into T as follows. An interval is de ned in T to be an ordered pair of instants (t; u), where t < u. (The intuition here is that an interval is a stretch of time between two instants; there is no presumption that an interval be identi ed with a set of instants, though this does provide a possible model for intervals if desired.) Thus I = f(t; u) 2 T T j t < ug: The relation`j' is de ned in T by the rule (t; u)j(v; w) = def u = v: If i = (t; u) then we put inf(i) t; sup(i) u. Thus the de nition of`j' could equivalently be given as ijj = def sup(i) = inf(j): We shall say that instant t limits interval i, written Lim(t; i), if t = inf(u) or t = sup(u), and that t falls within i, written t< ?i, if inf(i) < t < sup(i). Our de ned notations for intervals can then be characterised in T as follows: j v i , 8t(t< ?j ! t< ?i). i t j exists i ijj, and then i t j = (inf(i); sup(j)). i < j , sup(i) < inf(j) Note the`polymorphic' character of`<' as a relation either between instants or between intervals; it could also relate an instant and an interval, in either order: t < i , t < inf(i); i < t , sup(i) < t:
It would be pedantic to insist on separate symbols for the four possible cases; and besides, there is the same underlying intuition for all four of them.
Introducing uents
A theory of time alone is insu cient to generate change; we need to have states of a airs holding or not holding at di erent times. The fundamental notion is that of a uent, which is a function on times. This conforms to the eighteenth-century usage of Newton rather than the usage popularised by McCarthy and Hayes 6], whereby a uent is a function on situations rather than times. We shall restrict our attention to Boolean uents, i.e., functions from times to truth-values. Our`times' will be instants or intervals depending on the system we are working in. The converse does not follow, though it would appear that any counterexample must involve intermingling of a kind that cannot occur in I. For an example in IR-time, let be true at rational instants and false at irrational ones, within some interval i.
Then we have 8j v i:On( ; j) but we do not have On(? ; i). Third, HOM and NEG do not imply Ax10. To see this, a simple counterexample su ces. Assign truth values to by the rule At( ; t) $ t 6 = t 0 . Then since every interval has a subinterval not containing t 0 , the antecedent of Ax10 holds for any interval i. But if i contains t 0 , the consequent of Ax10 does not hold.
It thus appears that in order to simulate I within T we need to add extra axioms strong enough to give us Ax10 and the right-to-left implication in NEG*.
It turns out that there is a single very well-motivated axiom that will do the trick. The interval system I di ers from the instant system T in that it attaches no independent meaning to the notion of a uent holding at an instant; when I say`no independent meaning' I have in mind the idea that, for instance, if holds on interval i, and t< ?i, then even though it is natural to say that holds at t, it only does so by virtue of holding over an interval within which t falls. One possibility might therefore be to say that this is the only condition under which it makes sense to say that a uent holds at an instant, in other words to posit 8t(At( ; t) $ 9i(t< ?i^On( ; i))): This would, however lead to there being instants at which neither nor ? holds, thus contradicting NEG. This would happen for any instant which is the meeting point of two intervals, over one of which , and over the other ? , holds. When this happens, we must assume that one or other of , ? holds, and for the purposes of simulating I in T it des not matter which. On the other hand, if t is the meeting point of two intervals over both of which holds, then we must insist that holds at t as well. In any case, therefore, can only hold at an instant t if it holds over an interval limited by t, giving us our required axiom INST 8t(At( ; t) ! 9i(Lim(t; i)^On( ; i))) We shall show that INST implies both Ax10 and the right-to-left implication in NEG*.
By way of preparation, we introduce a simple lemma Lemma1 9t; j(t< ?i^Lim(t; j)^On( ; j)) ! 9k v iOn( ; k) Proof Assume t< ?i, Lim(t; j), and On( ; j). Then either t = inf(j) or t = sup(j).
If t = inf(j), then we can put j = (t; t 0 ). There are two cases to consider: { If t 0 sup(i) then j v i so we have j v i^On( ; j), satisfying the consequent of the lemma (with k = j).
{ If sup(i) < t 0 then (t; sup(i)) v i and (t; sup(i)) v j. Since we have On( ; j), the latter implies On( ; (t; sup(i))), by HOM. Hence we have (t; sup(i)) v i^On( ; (t; sup(i))), again satisfying the consequent of the lemma (with k = (t; sup(i))). The case t = sup(j) is handled in a precisely analogous way.
We now turn to the proofs of Ax10 and part of NEG*. First 
The \non-intermingling" principles
In this section we shall introduce a number of principles that have gured in the literature with the express intention of ruling out intermingling. Hamblin 5] states that Ax10 together with NEG implies This axiom excludes the possibility of inde nitely nely intermingled periods of redness and non-redness, or of high and low pitch, or of whatever else it is that we take the elementary predicates to represent. 3 The`discrete variation axiom terexample involves intermingling on both sides of a instant: assume we have t 1 < t 2 < t 3 < t 4 < < u < v 4 < v 3 < v 2 < v 1 where u is at once the earliest instant later than all the t r and the latest instant earlier than all the v s , and assign truth values to by the rule that holds at t if and only if one of the following holds: t = u For some n, t 2n t < t 2n+1 For some n, v 2n+1 < t v 2n
Hamblin and Allen
Then HAM is satis ed, since any interval over which does not hold has a subinterval over which ? holds, and conversely any interval over which ? fails to hold has a subinterval over which holds; but INST is not satis ed since we have At( ; u)^8i(Lim(u; i) ! :On( ; i)): Note also that Ax10 without NEG* does not imply HAM. A counterexample involves intermingling over an interval; suppose that i has no subinterval over which is constant in truth-value. Then Ax10 holds for the uninteresting reason that its antecedent is false for every interval i, since there are no intervals k v i such that On( ; k). On the other hand HAM does not hold for this set-up, since we have 8j v i:On( ; j) without having On(? ; j).
McDermott and Davis
McDermott 7] developed a temporal theory for AI; the formulae are presented in a Lisp-like notation that has not found favour in the temporal reasoning community, and hence looks pretty unreadable to us nowadays. The relevant formula, for our purposes, is his Axiom 9, formulated by Ernest Davis; shorn of its reference to variant possible futures (which is irrelevant for our present purposes) this axiom could be translated into our notation as: (DAV) 8 8t(9uConstant( ; (u; t))^9uConstant( ; (t; u))) where Constant( ; i) is an abbreviation for On( ; i) _ On(? ; i).
We can split DAV up into two formulae (DAVL) 8t9uConstant( ; (u; t)) (DAVR) 8t9uConstant( ; (t; u))
These can be given in a pure interval formulation as follows:
That these are equivalent to the formulations in terms of instants can be shown as follows.
First, assume DAVR, and let i = (s; t) be any interval. Then by DAVR, 9uConstant( ; (t; u)):
But ij(t; u), so 9j(ijj^Constant( ; j)): Hence DAVR ) DAVR .
Conversely, assume DAVR , and let t be any instant. Choose any s < t; then by DAVR , 9j((s; t)jj^Constant( ; j)):
Let j = (t; u). Then 9u(t < u^Constant( ; (t; u))): Hence DAVR ) DAVR.
Exactly analogous arguments apply to DAVL and DAVL 4.3 The Finite Decomposition Property Davis 4] gives an axiom equivalent to DAV and notes that in IR-time this is equivalent to the property that any bounded interval contains only nitely many maximal subintervals over which has constant truth-value. We shall call this the nite decomposition property, and write it as FD For every and every interval i there is a decomposition i = i 1 t i 2 t t i n such that for r = 1; : : :; n, Constant( ; i r ). As Davis points out, this is a second-order property, since to state it we have to quantify over sets of intervals.
The Transition Point property
Allen and Ferguson 2] state a`theorem useful for reasoning about when properties change truth values', which in our notation can be written as (TP) 8i; j(i < j^On( ; i)^On(? ; j) ! 9k; l(kjl^j v l^On( ; k)^On(? ; l)); Here TP stands for`transition point', the motivation being:
De ning a transition point to be the existence of adjacent intervals for which a property has complementary truth values, this axiom states that if a property has changed truth value, then there must be a transition point where it does so. 4 Allen and Ferguson claim that this follows from HAM and HOM, but as we shall see below, this is incorrect.
De ning intermingling
Our purpose is to investigate the relationships between the various non-intermingling principles discussed in the previous section and to determine precisely what kinds of intermingling they succeed in ruling out. To prepare for this we must rst discuss intermingling itself in more detail.
As we have seen, Prior's`fuzz' comes in two varieties, which we have called intermingling over an interval and intermingling in the neighbourhood of an instant. The latter in turn has three subvarieties, namely intermingling immediately before an instant, intermingling immediately after an instant, and intermingling on both sides of an instant. We give below exact characterisations of these four forms of intermingling; by a` -interval' we mean an interval i such that On( ; i), and by a` -instant' we mean an instant t such that At( ; t). Intermingling with respect to immediately before an instant t (for short`prefuzz on at t') occurs if between any -instant (respectively (? )-instant) earlier than t and t itself there is a (? )-instant (respectively -instant). This is expressed by Prefuzz( ; t) = def 8t 0 < t9t 00 < ?(t 0 ; t)(At( ; t 0 ) $ At(? ; t 00 )):
Again, we have symmetry:
8 ; t(Prefuzz( ; t) $ Prefuzz(? ; t)): 4 Allen and Ferguson 2], p.541.
Intermingling with respect to immediately after an instant t (for short`postfuzz on at t') occurs if between t and any -instant (respectively (? )-instant) later than t there is a (? )-instant (respectively -instant). This is expressed by Postfuzz( ; t) = def 8t 0 > t9t 00 2 (t; t 0 )(At( ; t 0 ) $ At(? ; t 00 )):
Note that both Prefuzz and Postfuzz can be given pure interval variants as follows: Prefuzz ( ; i) = def 8j < i9k(j < k < i^(On( ; k) $ On(? ; j)) Postfuzz ( ; i) = def 8j > i9k(i < k < j^(On( ; k) $ On(? ; j))
We must check the relationship between Prefuzz and Prefuzz, and likewise with the Postfuzz rules.
Assume Prefuzz( ; inf(i)) and j < i. Suppose rst that On(? ; j). Then either At( ; sup(j)) or At(? ; sup(j)).
If At( ; sup(j)), then by INST we have 9k(Lim(sup(j); k)^On( ; k)). The rst conjunct Lim(sup(j); k) means that either sup(j) = sup(k) or sup(j) = inf(k).
We cannot have the former, since in that case either j v k or k v j, either of which is incompatible with On( ; k)^On(? ; j). Hence sup(j) = inf(k), and j < k. But also k < i, since otherwise inf(i)< ?k, which given On( ; k) is incompatible with Prefuzz( ; inf(i)). Hence j < k < i^On( ; k).
If on the other hand At(? ; sup(j)), then we must have 9t< ?(sup(j); inf(i))At( ; t) (from Prefuzz( ; inf(i))). By INST, 9k(Lim(t; k)^On( ; t)), so by Lemma1 we have 9k v (sup(j); inf(i))On( ; k), i.e., 9k(j < k < i^On( ; k)).
Hence in either case we have 9k(j < k < i^(On(? ; j) ! On( ; k)): Suppose next that :On(? ; j). By NEG*, 9j 0 v jOn( ; j 0 ). We can now argue exactly as before to show that 9k(j 0 < k < i^(:On(? ; j) ! On(? ; k)):
But this implies 9k(j < k < i^(:On(? ; j) ! :On( ; k)):
Combining this with our earlier result we obtain 9k(j < k < i^(On( ; k) $ On(? ; j))); and since this applies to any j < i, we have Prefuzz ( ; i) as required. We thus have
Conversely, assume we have Prefuzz ( ; i), and suppose (t 0 < inf(i))^At( ; t 0 ). Assuming INST, there is an interval j such that Lim(t 0 ; j)^On( ; j). By Lemma 1,  there is j such that (j < i)^On( ; j). Then from Prefuzz ( ; i), there is an interval k such that j < k < i^On(? ; k). Choose any instant t 00 < ?k; then t 0 < t 00 < inf(i), and by INT, At(? ; t 00 ). We can similarly argue that if At(? ; t 0 ) then At( ; t 00 ).
Thus we have In intervals-only time, therefore, Prefuzz and Postfuzz can be used in place of Prefuzz and Postfuzz to characterise intermingling before and after an instant.
If we don't assume INST, however, the two pairs of conditions are di erent. To see this, suppose that in IR-time we assign truth-values to according to the rule At( ; t) , 9n 2 ZZ(t = 2 n ):
Then both Prefuzz( ; 0) and Postfuzz( ; 0) hold, but for no x do we have either Prefuzz ( ; (0; x)) or Postfuzz ( ; (x; 0)). Of course this particular truth-value assignment is impossible under INST.
Is there an intervals-only formulation of Intfuzz? Assuming Intfuzz( ; i), suppose 9j v iOn( ; j). Then let t; t 0 < ?j, so we have At( ; t)^At( ; t 0 ). By Intfuzz( ; i), there is an instant t 00 < ?(t; t 0 ) such that At(? ; t 00 ). But since (t; t 0 ) v j, we know t 00 < ?j, so At( ; t 00 ), a contradiction. Hence 6 What kinds of intermingling are ruled out by the non-intermingling principles?
In this section we shall consider each of the non-intermingling principles in turn and investigate which kinds of intermingling it rules out. It will be convenient to use a standard notation for examples of the di erent kinds of intermingling at an instant. For this purpose we will always assume that t 0 ; t 1 ; t 2 ; : : : are a sequence of instants converging on instant u from the past, while v 0 ; v 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 ; : : : are a sequence of instants converging on u from the future, so we have t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < t 3 < < u < < v 3 < v 2 < v 1 < v 0 :
(For example, we could put, in IR-time or Q I -time, u = 0, t i = ?2 ?i , and v i = 2 ?i .)
We shall also put i n = (t n ; t n+1 ); j n = (v n+1 ; v n ); giving us intervals such that: i 0 ji 1 ji 2 ji 3 j < jj 3 jj 2 jj 1 jj 0 ; the picture appropriate to an intervals-only formulation.
We shall make use of standard truth-assignments for a proposition as follows: | (PREFUZZ ) For n = 0; 1; 2; 3; : :: put On( ; i 2n )^On(? ; i 2n+1 ): The value of at t n , at u, and at any time in the future of u, is left unspeci ed. | (POSTFUZZ ) For n = 0; 1; 2; 3; :: : put On( ; j 2n )^On(? ; j 2n+1 ): The value of at v n , at u, and at any time in the past of u, is left unspeci ed. | (PREFUZZ) For n = 0; 1; 2; 3; :: :, put At( ; t n )^On(? ; i n ): The value of at u and at any time in the future of u is left unspeci ed. | (POSTFUZZ) For n = 0; 1; 2; 3; :::, put At( ; v n )^On(? ; j n ): The value of at u and at any time in the past of u is left unspeci ed. | (PRECONST) holds constantly before u, i.e., 8t < uOn( ; (t; u)): | (POSTCONST) holds constantly after u, i.e., 8v > uOn( ; (u; v)):
Note that, if i and j are intervals such that sup(i) = u = inf(j), then PREFUZZ satis es both Prefuzz( ; u) and Prefuzz ( ; j); PREFUZZ satis es Prefuzz( ; u) but does not satisfy Prefuzz ( ; j). POSTFUZZ satis es both Postfuzz( ; u) and Postfuzz ( ; i); POSTFUZZ satis es Postfuzz( ; u) but does not satisfy Postfuzz ( ; i). We will generally specify a truth assignment to by combining one of the PREconditions from the above list with one of the POST-conditions. 
HAM does not rule out intermingling at an instant
However, HAM does not rule out any of the other kinds of intermingling. Consider for example, the truth-assignment PREFUZZ +POSTCONST. Now take any interval i = (x; y) such that :On( ; i). Clearly we must have x < u, otherwise i would be a subinterval of (u; y), and we would have On( ; i). We are looking for a subinterval j of i such that On(? ; j).
Let n be the greatest integer such that x t 2n . Then if t 2n < y we have (t 2n ; y) v i 2n ; (t 2n ; y) v (x; y); so we can put j = (t 2n ; y) and we have On(? ; j). If y t 2n then we must have x < t 2n?1 , for otherwise we would have (x; y) v i 2n?1 , giving On( ; i) contrary to our hypothesis. If y t 2n?1 then (x; y) v t 2n?2 , so On(? ; (x; y)) and we can put j = (x; y). If on the other hand y > t 2n?1 , we put j = (x; t 2n?1 ). This exhausts the possibilities; so in any case we conclude that i has a subinterval j such that On(? ; j), and we have shown that HAM holds for this set-up. Since both Prefuzz( ; u) and Prefuzz ( ; j) for any j > u also hold here, HAM does not preclude either of them.
Arguing from the temporal mirror image of this set-up gives us a similar conclusion in regards to Postfuzz and Postfuzz .
INST
The principle INST is expressed by the formula 8t(At( ; t) ! 9i(Lim(t; i)^On( ; i))): As already shown, this implies HAM, and therefore rules out anything that the latter rules out|in particular, intermingling over an interval.
We have also already seen that, unlike HAM, INST rules out intermingling on both sides of an instant, as exempli ed by PREFUZZ +POSTFUZZ .
However, INST does not rule out intermingling on just one side of an instant, for example PREFUZZ +POSTCONST, with At( ; u). In this example, given an instant t, one of four cases holds: { t is later than u, and hence holds at t and on any interval of the form (t; x). { t falls within one of the intervals i n . If n is even, holds at t and on (t; t n+1 );
if n is odd, ? holds at t and on (t; t n+1 ).
{ t = t n for some n. If At( ; t) then we have either On( ; (t n?1 ; t) (if n is odd) or On( ; (t; t n+1 ) (if n is even); while if At(? ; t) then we have either On(? ; (t n?1 ; t) (if n is even) or On(? ; (t; t n+1 ) (if n is odd). { t = u. In this case we have At( ; t) and On( ; t; x) for any x.
In any case, therefore, if At( ; t), holds on some interval limited by t, so INST is satis ed.
Likewise, INST does not rule out PRECONST+POSTFUZZ .
TP
TP says that if is true over an interval i and false over some later interval j, then there is a transition point at which an interval over which is true meets an interval containing j over which is false.
6.3.1 TP is not entailed by HAM Allen and Ferguson 2] claim that HAM entails TP. We begin by showing that this is not, in fact, correct, by constructing a counterexample in which HAM holds but TP does not.
Our counterexample is the same set-up as in the previous section, i.e., PREFUZZ + POSTCONST. As we have seen, this satis es HAM. On the other hand, TP does not hold, since for example, we have On( ; (u; v 1 )) and On(? ; i 2 ), so the antecedent of TP is satis ed; but there are no intervals k and l such that k meets l, (u; v 1 ) v l and On( ; k) and On(? ; l)|given any interval k such that On( ; k), changes truth value in nitely often between the end of k and u.
6.3.2 TP does not rule out intermingling after an instant TP rules out the kind of intermingling in the previous example, but in fact, TP does not rule out all forms of intermingling at an instant. Consider, for example, the mirror image of the situation just considered, namely POSTFUZZ +PRECONST. Suppose the antecedent of TP holds for some pair of intervals i; j with respect to , so we have i < j^On( ; i)^On(? ; j):
By POSTFUZZ , we must have j v j 2n?1 for some n, so we have j 2n jj 2n?1^j v j 2n?1^O n( ; j 2n )^On(? ; j 2n?1 ); which means that the consequent of TP is satis ed in this case.
Equally, suppose the antecedent of TP holds for i; j with respect to ? , i.e., i < j^On(? ; i)^On( ; j):
In this case we know that j v j 2n for some n (we can't have j < u since no such j is preceded by an i on which ? holds). In that case we have j 2n+1 jj 2n^j v j 2n^O n(? ; j 2n+1 )^On( ; j 2n ); so the consequent of TP is satis ed in this case as well.
6.3.3
The mirror-image of TP rules out intermingling after an instant While TP, as stated, rules out the case of fuzz before an instant without fuzz after it (as exempli ed by PREFUZZ +POSTCONST), it does not rule out the case of fuzz after an instant without fuzz before it (as in POSTFUZZ +PRECONST). This asymmetric behaviour is a natural consequence of the asymmetry in TP itself. To rule out POSTFUZZ +PRECONST we should have to use the temporal mirror-image of TP, namely (TPM) 8i; j(i < j^On( ; i)^On(? ; j) ! 9k; l(kjl^i v k^On( ; k)^On(? ; l));
This will rule out POSTFUZZ + PRECONST, but of course it will not rule out PREFUZZ + POSTCONST.
6.3.4 TP and its mirror-image together fail to rule out intermingling around an instant The conjunction of TP with TPM will rule out both PREFUZZ +POSTCONST and POSTFUZZ +PRECONST; but it will not rule out intermingling at an instant altogether. To see this, consider the situation PREFUZZ +POSTFUZZ . This gives us intermingling in the vicinity of u, since changes truth-value at all instants t n and v n , and there are in nitely many such instants in any neighbourhood of u. On the other hand both TP and TPM are satis ed.
To see this for TP, let i and j be any intervals such that i < j^On( ; i)^On(? ; j):
We are looking for intervals k; l such that k meets l, j is a subinterval of l, and On( ; k)^On(? ; l). Since On(? ; i), j must be contained in an interval either of the form i 2n+1 or of the form j 2n+1 . Let this interval be l. In the former case we can put k = i 2n ; in the latter case we can put k = j 2n+2 . An analogous argument goes through if and ? are interchanged. The argument for TPM is just the mirror-image of the above. An obvious idea is to try to rule out this kind of intermingling by strengthening TP+TPM to the following axiom: 8i; j(i < j^On( ; i)^On(? ; j) ! 9k; l(kjl^k v i^j v l^On( ; k)^On(? ; l)):
But obvious as the idea is, it is just as obviously not what we need, for its e ect is to rule out far too much: in fact no Boolean uent can change value more than twice in any interval if this axiom is to hold! In fairness, it should be pointed out that TP was not proposed by Allen as a non-intermingling principle in itself; rather he wanted it to be a consequence of the non-intermingling principle HAM. Nonetheless it is instructive to examine just where TP stands in relation to intermingling.
TP does not rule out intermingling over an interval
Finally, we should consider whether TP rules out intermingling over an interval. In fact it does not. Consider the following set-up, using our standard t i ; u; v j : { for any t < t 0 , On( ; (t; t 0 )) { Intfuzz( ; (t 0 ; u)) { POSTFUZZ* { for any t > v 0 , On( ; (v 0 ; t)) Then in order to have i < j^On( ; i)^On(? ; j) (i.e., the antecedent of TP) we must have j v j 2n+1 for some n, and hence we have j 2n+2 jj 2n+1^j v j 2n+1^O n( ; j 2n+2 )^On(? ; j 2n+1 ); so the consequent of TP is satis ed.
Real vs Rational Time
Up to this point we have not had to concern ourselves with the question of whether our model of the temporal order is more like the ordering of the real numbers or that of the rational numbers. When we come to consider the principles DAV and FD, however, this issue becomes crucial, and we must therefore establish some procedures for handling it rst.
The key property di erentiating the reals from the rationals can be expressed in the form Every bounded set of reals has a least upper bound.
In other words, if S is a set of real numbers for which there is a real number b such that no element of S is greater than b, then there is a least such b:
Note that this condition also guarantees a greatest lower bound for a set which is bounded below: given such a set S, put L = fx 2 IR j 8y 2 S(x < y)g:
This will be non-empty so long as S is bounded below. Then L is bounded above (by any member of S), hence has a least upper bound. It is easy to see that this is also the greatest lower bound of S.
If our time-line (T; <) is ordered like the reals, then, we have the (second-order) axiom (REALTIME) 8S T((9u8t 2 S(t u)) ! 9u8v((8t 2 S(t v)) $ u v)):
It will be useful to have an interval-based formulation of this axiom as well. The following will do (here we use Int to designate the set of all intervals):
In Q I -time, REALTIME does not hold, which means that there exist instants t r ; v s such that t 1 < t 2 < t 3 < < v 3 < v 2 < v 1 without there being any instant u such that, for r = 1; 2; 3; : ::, t r < u < v r :
We shall call a con guration of this kind a gap, the idea being that the (irrational) instant of separation between the t r and the v s is`missing' from the rational scheme of things. An interval formulation would be that there exist intervals i r ; j s such that i 1 ji 2 ji 3 j < jj 3 jj 2 jj 1 without there being intervals i; j such that ijj^8r(i r < j^i < j r ):
The two formulations are related by the equations i r = (t r ; t r+1 ); j r = (v r+1 ; v r ). It is worth stressing at this point that Q I -time allows some somewhat bizarre phenomena: in particular it allows a form of intermingling which di ers importantly from those we have looked at up to now. For suppose we have sequences t r ; v s as described above, and assign truth-values to according to the scheme: On( ; i 2n ) On( ; j 2n ) On(? ; i 2n+1 ) On(? ; j 2n+1 ) for n = 1; 2; 3; : ::. Then we have what to all intents looks like intermingling around an instant|except that there is no instant on which the intermingling centres! We shall refer to this as intermingling around a gap. The point about IR-time is precisely that there are no gaps in this sense.
6.5 DAV DAV says, in e ect, that every instant is the meeting point of two intervals over which has constant truth-value (the choice of the two intervals depending in general on ).
DAV does not imply HAM
A simple counterexample su ces: let t 0 be an arbitrary instant, and assign values to by the rule 8t(At( ; t) $ t 6 = t 0 ): Then 1. For any t < t 0 we have On( ; (t 0 ; t))^On( ; (t; t 0 )) where t 0 is any instant earlier than t; 2. For any t > t 0 we have On( ; (t 0 ; t))^On( ; (t; t 00 )) where t 00 is any instant later than t;
3. For t = t 0 we have On( ; (t 0 ; t))^On( ; (t; t 00 )), where t 0 ; t 00 are as in 1 and 2 above.
Hence DAV is satis ed.
On the other hand, for any t 0 < t 0 < t 00 , we have :On( ; (t 0 ; t 00 ))^:9j v (t 0 ; t 00 )(On(? ; j)); directly contradicting HAM. 6.5.2 DAV rules out intermingling over an interval Let i be any interval, and let t< ?i; then assuming DAV, there are intervals j; j 0 such that sup(j) = t = inf(j 0 ), and Constant( ; j) and Constant( ; j 0 ). In particular there is an interval j such that Lim(t; j)^(On( ; j) _ On(? ; j)). By Lemma1, there is an interval j v i such that On( ; j) _ On(? ; j), i.e., Constant( ; j). So DAV implies 8i9j v iConstant( ; i):
This can be rewritten as :9i8j v i:Constant( ; j); i.e., :9iIntfuzz ( ; i).
6.5.3 DAV rules out intermingling at an instant DAVL is the formula 8t9uConstant( ; (u; t)):
Note that we must have u < t here, since cannot have a truth-value over a nonexistent interval. Now for any instant t we choose, we have 9u < tConstant( ; (u; t)) , 9u < t(On( ; (u; t)) _ On(? ; (u; t))) , 9u < t(8t 0 < ?(u; t)At( ; t 0 ) _ 8t 00 < ?(u; t)At(? ; t 00 )) , :8u < t(9t 0 ; t 00 < ?(u; t)(At(? ; t 0 )^At( ; t 00 )) , :8u < t9t 0 < ?(u; t)(At( ; u) $ At(? ; t 0 )) , :Prefuzz( ; t) (The reasoning behind the penultimate step is as follows. We must have either At( ; u) or At(? ; u): in the former case, pick t 0 to be the t 0 of the next line, in the latter case, pick t 00 .) Thus DAVL rules out Prefuzz( ; t) for all and t, and likewise DAVR rules out Postfuzz( ; t) for all and t. So DAV itself rules out intermingling before, after, or around an instant.
The only form of intermingling not ruled out by DAV is the curious intermingling at a gap in Q I -time. This will be discussed further in the section on FD.
FD
FD is the principle which says that for a given uent , any interval can be decomposed into a nite number of subintervals over each of which the truth-value of is constant.
FD implies DAV
This is one of the more straightforward implications we have to deal with. Suppose FD holds, and let ijj. By FD, we have i = i 1 t i 2 t t i m j = j 1 t j 2 t t j n where for r = 1; : : :; m, Constant( ; i r ), and for s = 1; : : :; s n , Constant( ; j s ). In particular, we have i m jj^ijj 1^C onstant( ; i m )^Constant( ; j 1 ); so DAV is satis ed (in the form DAVL*+DAVR*). Hence FD implies DAV; like DAV, therefore, it rules out intermingling over an interval and before, after, or around an instant.
DAV is equivalent to FD in IR-time
In view of the previous result we need only show that DAV implies FD in IR-time. Suppose then that we have both DAV and REALTIME, and let i = (t 0 ; u) be any interval. We must show that i = i 1 t i 2 t t i n where, for r = 1; : : :; n, Constant( ; i r ).
Let T 1 = ft j Constant( ; (t 0 ; t))g. By DAV, T 1 6 = ;. If u 2 T 1 , then we have Constant( ; (t 0 ; u)), so we can put n = 1, i n = i.
If u = 2 T 1 , then T 1 is bounded above by u, so by REALTIME T 1 has a least upper bound, t 1 .
We must have Constant( ; (t 0 ; t 1 )), for if not, there are instants t; t 0 < ?(t 0 ; t 1 ) such that At( ; t)^At(? ; t 0 ). Now let t 00 < ?(t 0 ; t 1 ), where t < t 00 and t 0 < t 00 (such an instant must exist by the density axiom T3). Then we have :Constant( ; (t 0 ; t 00 )), so t 00 = 2 T 1 , and t 1 cannot be the least upper bound of T 1 .
Repeating this construction we generate a ( nite or in nite) sequence of instants t 0 < t 1 < t 2 < t 3 < such that for n = 0; 1; 2; 3; :: :, Constant( ; (t n ; t n+1 )), and in addition, for n = 0; 1; 2; 3;: ::, On( ; t n+1 ) $ On(? ; t n ). If t n < u for all n, then ft i j n = 0; 1; 2; 3; : ::g is bounded above by u and hence by REALTIME has a least upper bound, t 1 . But then we have Prefuzz( ; t 1 ), which is ruled out by DAV. Hence for some n we have t n u. This then gives us the desired nite decomposition i = (t 0 ; t 1 ) t (t 1 ; t 2 ) t t (t n?2 ; t n?1 ) t (t n?1 ; u): We have thus shown that in IR-time, DAV implies FD.
(This result was proved by Davis; I have not seen his proof, but it is presumably along similar lines to the above.) 6.6.3 DAV is not equivalent to FD in Q I -time A counterexample is a orded by the`intermingling around a gap' already described. Suppose t 1 < t 2 < t 3 < < v 3 < v 2 < v 1 without there being any instant u such that t 1 < t 2 < t 3 < < u < < v 3 < v 2 < v 1 ;
and assign truth-values according to the scheme On( ; (t 2n ; t 2n+1 )) On( ; (v 2n+1 ; v 2n )) On(? ; (t 2n+1 ; t 2n+2 )) On(? ; (v 2n+2 ; v 2n+1 ))
Pick an arbitrary instant t. There are four cases 5 : { t = t n for some n. In that case, we have Constant( ; (t n?1 ; t))^Constant( ; (t; t n+1 )):
{ t = v n for some n. Then Constant( ; (v n+1 ; t))^Constant( ; (t; v n?1 )): { t n < t < t n+1 for some n. Then Constant( ; (t n ; t))^Constant( ; (t; t n+1 )): { v n+1 < t < v n for some n. Then Constant( ; (v n+1 ; t))^Constant( ; (t; v n )):
So DAV holds; but not FD, since in any interval of the form (t i ; v j ), changes value in nitely often, so no nite decomposition into subintervals of constant is possible.
FD rules out all forms of intermingling
Since FD implies DAV, it rules out all the forms of intermingling that DAV rules out, namely intermingling over an interval, and before, after or around an instant. In addition, as was shown above, it rules out intermingling around a gap. There are no other forms of intermingling to consider|one can admittedly concoct bizarre scenarios such as intermingling about each member of an in nite sequence of instants converging to a limit, but this is already ruled out by ruling out intermingling about an instant. FD is the only non-intermingling principle we have considered that rules out intermingling about a gap.
Concluding remarks
The results of our investigation are summarised in the following We may distinguish between the`weak' non-intermingling principles|the rst four lines in the table|which only succeed in ruling out one or two forms of intermingling (but a di erent selection in each case), and`strong' non-intermingling principles|the last two lines|which succeed in ruling out all or nearly all forms of intermingling.
If one seriously wants to rule out intermingling, one had better opt for one of the strong principles DAV and FD. Davis's motivation for wishing to replace FD by DAV is that FD`uses a high-order expression, posed in terms of the cardinality of a set of intervals'. There is a sleight of hand here, which Davis acknowledges in a somewhat oblique fashion by his reference to non-standard models of the rstorder axiomatisation of the reals. Put more directly, it would seem that to rule out intermingling some second-order principle is required: if you don't want to state FD explicitly then you have to smuggle the high-order principle in in the form of a determination to be reasoning over the reals, which require a second-order principle (e.g., the least upper bound principle) to be pinned down uniquely. But if for whatever reason you do not want to commit yourself to IR-time, and still want to rule out intermingling, then DAV is not strong enough, as we have seen: in this case, you might as well assert FD explicitly. The disadvantage of this is a possible loss of decidability: by Tarski's theorem, any rst-order theory over the reals (which could therefore include DAV but not FD) is fully decidable.
A more exact view of the limitations of rst-order theories with respect to intermingling is a orded by the Compactness Theorem for rst-order logic. For suppose is a rst-order theory which rules out intermingling. For each positive integer n let F n be the rst-order formula t 1 < t 2 < < t 2n?1 < t 2n < tÂ t( ; t 1 )^At(? ; t 2 )^At( ; t 3 )^At(? ; t 4 )^: : :^At( ; t 2n?1 )^At(? ; t 2n ): If F n is true for every n, we have intermingling. If there is a least upper bound for the sequence t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 ; : : : then it is intermingling before that instant, otherwise it is intermingling before a gap. Since rules out intermingling, we have fF n j n > 0g j = ?:
By the Compactness Theorem, there must be an integer N such that fF 1 ; F 2 ; : : :; F N g j = ?:
But this means that in any model for , the truth value of cannot change more than N times. Thus any rst-order theory which successfully rules out all in nite intermingling also places a nite limit on the variability of each uent 6 .
Finally, a disclaimer: all the authors we have discussed, apart from Davis, have taken it for granted that we want to outlaw intermingling. Davis, on the other hand, is at pains to point out situations in which it might be useful to allow it|not because intermingling actually occurs in the world, but because many natural and useful idealisations of the world would be outlawed if we were not to allow it. In this paper I have con ned myself to the investigation of what forms of intermingling are ruled out by each of the non-intermingling principles; I have not pursued in any depth the question under what circumstances it is desirable to rule out some or all of these forms of intermingling.
